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This	   paper	   analyses	   multiple	   policy	   instruments	   used	   by	   the	   EU	   and	   their	   effects	   in	   the	  
Western	  Balkans	  from	  a	  conflict	  networks	  perspective,	  developed	  by	  the	  authors.	  The	  conflict	  
network	   perspective	   is	   an	   agential	   approach	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   networks	   on	   peacebuilding	  
outcomes	   that	  analyzes	   relations	   rather	   than	  actors	  or	   categories.	   It	  allows	  us	   to	  capture	  an	  
enduring	  character	  of	  relations	  developed	  through	  war-­‐time	  violence	  which	  are	  sustained	  and	  
reworked	   in	   the	   context	  of	   a	   local	  political	   authority	   in	   response	   to	   the	   international	  peace-­‐
building	   efforts.	   The	   three	   case	   studies	   of	   hybrid	   development,	   hybrid	   security	   and	   hybrid	  
justice,	   demonstrate	   how	   the	   EU	   policy	   produces	   three	   types	   of	   outcomes:	   subversion,	  
unintended	  consequences	  and	  a	  qualified	  success,	  when	  it	  encounters	  a	  networked	  nature	  of	  
the	  political	  authority.	  We	  conclude	  by	  reviewing	  the	  risks	  for	  the	  EU	  policy	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  
identify	  policy	  implications.	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Since	   the	   late	   1990s,	   and	   following	   its	   early	   diplomatic	   efforts	   to	   mediate	   in	   the	  
conflict	  that	  destroyed	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  a	   lead	   international	  actor	  
engaged	  in	  supporting	  the	  peacebuilding	  process	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans1,	  after	  it	  took	  
over	  both	  military	  missions	   and	   civilian	   roles	   from	  NATO	  and	   the	  UN	   respectively.	   It	  
has	  deployed	  a	  full	  array	  of	  military	  and	  civilian	  instruments	  available	  under	  the	  CFSP	  
umbrella	  alongside	  enlargement	  instruments	  specially	  tailored	  to	  address	  the	  legacy	  of	  
armed	   conflicts.	   On	   the	   territory	   of	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   five	   military	   and	   civilian	  
missions	  mandated	  to	  maintain	  safe	  and	  secure	  environments	  for	  the	  implementation	  
of	  peace	  agreements	  which	  ended	  armed	  conflict	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  (Dayton	  PA),	  
Kosovo	   (UN	   Resolution	   1244)	   and	   FYR	   Macedonia	   (Ohrid	   agreement),	   have	   been	  
implemented.	   Those	   missions	   were	   upended	   by	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   Stabilisation	   and	  
Association	  Process	  (SAP)	  as	  a	  broader	  policy	  framework	  to	  support	  peacebuilding	  by	  
pursuing	   an	   EU	  member	   state-­‐building	   agenda.	   Although	   SAP	   has	   formally	   been	   the	  
main	  framework	  for	  the	  EU	  engagement	  since	  2001,	  in	  practice	  it	  has	  been	  paralleled	  
by	  explicit	  instances	  of	  CFSP	  action	  outside	  and	  beyond	  the	  CSDP	  missions;	  moreover,	  
the	   specifically	   tailored	   SAP	   conditionality	   works	   across	   the	   CFSP	   and	   enlargement	  
policy	  portfolios.	  
While	   the	   EU’s	   approach	   to	   the	   Western	   Balkans	   has	   evolved	   over	   the	   years,	   its	  
primary	   focus	   has	   been	   to	   maintain	   security	   and	   prevent	   reactivation	   of	   armed	  
violence	   both	   within	   and	   between	   states.	   Such	   an	   aptitude	   is	   demonstrated	   in	   the	  
application	   of	   policy	   conditionality,	   which	   remains	   primarily	   responsive	   to	   security	  
dynamics	   in	   the	   region.	   As	   a	   result,	   other	   constitutive	   aspects	   of	   peacebuilding,	  
including	   economic	   development	   and	   support	   to	   civil	   society	   and	   broader	   issues	   of	  
social	   justice,	   including	   transitional	   justice,	   have	   been	   effectively	   subservient	   to	   a	  
narrow	   stabilisation	   agenda.	   This	   has	   arguably	   worked	   to	   circumscribe	   the	   overall	  
impact	  of	  EU	  intervention	  in	  advancing	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  objectives	  
in	   the	  Western	  Balkans.	  A	  number	  of	  events	   in	  2015	   seem	   to	   corroborate	   this	   view,	  
prompting	  some	  commentators	  to	  claim	  that	  inter-­‐state	  relations	  across	  the	  Western	  
Balkans	   are	   at	   their	   lowest	   in	   a	   long	   time	   with	   the	   local	   leaders’	   rhetoric	   erringly	  
reminiscent	  of	  early	  1990s	  (Dedic,	  2015).	  Capturing	  most	  potently	  a	  still	  fragile	  state	  of	  
reconciliation	   in	   the	   region-­‐	   both	   among	   the	   political	   elites	   as	   well	   as	   the	   general	  
public-­‐	   is	   the	   case	  of	   Serbia’s	  prime	  minister	  Aleksandar	  Vucic’s	   ill	   received	   initiative	  
for	   a	   region-­‐wide	   commemoration	   day	   for	   all	   the	   war	   victims	   in	   the	   region,	   he	  
launched	  after	  the	  Srebrenica	  incident	  (Bojicic-­‐Dzelilovic	  2015).	  	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  make	  an	  argument	  that	  EU	  interventions	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  have	  
had	  an	  ambiguous	  effect	   in	  terms	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  outcomes.	  
Depending	   on	   the	   issue	   area,	   the	   interventions	   have	   either	   produced	   unintended	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




consequences,	   had	   counter	   effects	   with	   respect	   to	   stated	   objectives,	   or	   proved	   a	  
qualified	   success.	   Such	   outcomes	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   three	   main	   shortcomings	   in	   the	  
existing	   approach	   to	   peacebuilding	   in	   the	   Western	   Balkans	   pursued	   by	   the	   EU	  :	   1)	  
state-­‐centric	   focus	  ;	   2)	   the	   fragmentation	  across	  policy	  domains	  ;	   and	  3)	   inconsistent	  
conditionality.	  The	  paper	  maps	  the	  EU	  interventions	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  since	  the	  
breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  traces	  the	  EU’s	  changing	  role	  as	  a	  peacebuilding	  actor,	  by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  relationships	  across	  the	   levels	  at	  which	  the	  EU	   interventions	  operate	  
and	   across	   the	   policy	   domains.	   To	   illustrate	   the	   instances	   of	   tensions,	   gaps	   and	  
potential	   successes	   attributed	   to	   such	   policy	   interventions,	   which	   have	   produced	   a	  
distinct	   form	   of	   hybrid	   peace,	   the	   paper	   adopts	   a	   conflict	   network	   perspective	  
(elaborated	  below)	  to	  analyse	  the	  impact	  of	  EU	  policies	   in	  three	  areas:	  private	  sector	  
development,	   security	   sector	   reform,	   and	   justice	   and	   reconciliation.	   The	   concluding	  
section	  summarises	  the	  findings	  and	  refelcts	  on	  policy	  implications.	  
	  
EU	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans:	  Policy	  Overview	  
The	  establishment	  of	   the	  Stablisation	  and	  Association	  Process	   (SAP)	  after	  the	  Kosovo	  
war	  in	  1999	  offered	  an	  emergent	  European	  perspective	  for	  Western	  Balkan	  countries.	  
The	   SAP	   expressed	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   region’s	   economic	   and	   structural	  
development,	   through	   EU	   financial	   and	   technical	   assistance	   and	   through	   the	  
establishment	   of	   provisions	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   key	   EU	   principles	   of	   rule	   of	   law,	  
democratic	  processes,	  free	  markets,	  and	  stable	  institutions.	  Below,	  a	  mapping	  exercise	  
of	   the	   instruments	   employed	  by	   the	   EU	   reveals	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   approaches	   to	  
Europeanisation	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  at	  regional,	  state	  and	  local	  levels.	  
Humanitarian	  
EU’s	   engagement	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   humanitarian	   assistance	   for	   basic	   social	   needs	  
including	   food,	  water,	   hygiene,	  medicine,	   clothing	   and	   so	  on,	   goes	  back	   to	   the	  early	  
stages	   of	   the	   conflict	   triggered	   by	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia’s	   dissolution.	   European	  
Community	  Monitoring	  Mission	   in	   Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina	  was	   for	   example	   involved	   in	  
negotiating	   humanitarian	   operations	   with	   the	   local	   warring	   parties.	   Humanitarian	  
assistance	   was	   directed	   by	   the	   European	   Community	   Humanitarian	   Office	   (ECHO)	  
established	  in	  1992,	  which	  operated	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  International	  Committee	  
of	   Red	   Cross,	   UNHCR,	   UNICEF,	   the	   World	   Food	   Program,	   and	   international	   non-­‐
governmental	   organisations.	   Besides	   the	   partnership	   with	   other	   agencies,	   ECHO	  
directly	  engaged	  in	  assisting	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  populations	  throughout	  the	  region	  






EU	   policies	   concerning	   stabilisation	   have	   been	   directed	   primarily	   at	   the	   state	   and	  
regional	  level.	  The	  Stability	  Pact	  of	  1999,	  pre-­‐dating	  the	  SAP,	  was	  established	  with	  the	  
aim	   of	   transforming	   the	   governance	   dynamics	   of	   the	   region,	   and	   became	   a	   central	  
complementary	  mechanism	   in	   support	   of	   the	   SAP.	   Addressing	   the	   varied	   aspects	   of	  
governance	  development	  in	  the	  Balkan	  neighbourhood,	  the	  Stability	  Pact	  was	  divided	  
among	   three	   Working	   Tables,	   reflecting	   areas	   of	   concern	   for	   domestic	   reform	   as,	  
Democratisation	   and	   Human	   Rights,	   Economic	   Reconstruction,	   Development	   and	  
Cooperation,	  and	  Security	  Issues.	  	  	  
In	   2008,	   the	   Stability	   Pact	  was	   replaced	  by	   the	  Regional	   Cooperation	  Council	   (RCC),	  
functioning	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  regional	  cooperation	  whose	  key	  role	  was	  to	  “generate	  
and	  coordinate	  developmental	  projects	  of	  a	  wider,	  regional	  character,	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  
each	   individual	   participant”.2	   The	   RCC	   framework	   reflects	   a	   dominant	   focus	   on	   the	  
regional	  level	  and	  a	  concern	  for	  establishing	  the	  domestic	  and	  regional	  conditions	  for	  
the	   implementation	   of	   European	   developmental	   projects	   primarily	   in	   the	   area	   of	  
Justice	   and	   Home	   Affairs,	   to	   which	   the	   fight	   against	   organised	   crime	   and	   the	  
management	  of	  migration	  and	  asylum	  pertain.	  
Association	  
The	   European	   Union	   has	   signed	  Association	   Agreements	  with	   third	   parties	   on	   a	   bi-­‐
lateral	  and	  multi-­‐lateral	  level	  to	  engage	  primarily	  with	  trade	  and	  liberalisation	  reforms.	  
In	   the	   Western	   Balkans,	   these	   agreements	   have	   been	   extended	   to	   establish	   a	  
privileged	  relationship	  that	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  cooperation	  and	  actively	  seeks	  to	  create	  
instruments	  that	  can	  monitor	  and	  enhance	  the	  progress	  of	  reforms.	  Because	  of	  using	  a	  
bilateral	   track,	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   agreements	   has	   been	   stronger	   at	   the	   state	   level	  
than	  the	  regional	  level,	  where	  multi-­‐country	  agreements	  have	  been	  signed,	  such	  as	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  in	  2006.	  
Bi-­‐lateral	   negotiations	   have	   figured	   prominently	   in	   the	   EU's	   strategy	   towards	   its	  
immediate	  neighbouring	   countries.	   Even	  before	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	   clear	  path	   to	  
EU	  candidacy,	  and	  before	   the	  SAA	   in	  early	  2001,	  bi-­‐lateral	  negotiations	  between	   the	  
EU	   and	   Serbia-­‐Montenegro	   led	   the	   EU	   to	   become	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   political	  
process	  of	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Federal	  Union.	  Whilst	  Javier	  Solana	  sought	  to	  preserve	  the	  
unity	  of	  the	  Federal	  Union,	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  obtained	  by	  Montenegro,	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   Union	   institutions,	   combined	  with	   the	   extension	   of	   reform-­‐
inducing	  conditionalities,	  accelerated	  the	  widening	  of	  the	  gap	  in	  capacity	  between	  the	  
two	   entities	   as	   they	   failed	   to	   harmonise	   their	   policies	   and	   structures	   towards	   a	  
common	  EU	  future	  (Tocci,	  2007:96).	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Whereas	   Association	   Agreements	   replaced	   previous	   Cooperation	   Agreements	   and	  
reinforced	   the	   role	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   region,	   the	   signing	   of	   Stability	   and	  Association	  
Agreements	   (SAAs)	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  regional	  partners	   in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  
signified	   a	   further	   re-­‐definition	   and	  more	   permanent	   cementing	   of	   EU’s	   role	   in	   the	  
region.	   The	   focus	   on	   EU	   assistance,	   once	   again,	   remains	  mainly	   at	   state	   level,	   with	  
agreements	  establishing	  extensive	  technical	  assistance	  to	  support	  institution-­‐building,	  
and	  the	  attainment	  of	  standards	  necessary	  for	  the	  start	  of	  pre-­‐accession	  talks.	   In	  the	  
case	  of	  Bosnia,	  instruments	  such	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  State	  Aid	  Law	  stem	  directly	  from	  
the	  SAA	  and,	   together	  with	  other	   state-­‐level	  provisions	   such	  as	   the	  establishment	  of	  
census	  law,	  were	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  important	  institutional	  reforms	  deemed	  central	  
for	   the	   country's	   EU	   integration	   prospects.3	   The	   establishment	   of	   a	   clear	   European	  
prospect	  for	  Bosnia,	  led	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  merge	  its	  Special	  Representative	  Office	  
with	  its	  Delegation	  Office	  in	  Sarajevo,	  in	  order	  to	  combine	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  European	  
Commission	  and	  of	  the	  European	  External	  Action	  Service;	  this	  was	  also	  the	  case	  in	  FYR	  
Macedonia.	   An	   additional	   instrument	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   the	   form	   of	   European	  
Partnerships-­‐	  as	  detailed	  country-­‐tailored	  reform	  road	  maps	  in	  support	  of	  SAP.	  
The	  impact	  of	  association	  policy	  at	  the	  local	  level	  has	  figured	  less	  prominently.	  The	  EU	  
has	   also	   embraced	   several	   important	   local-­‐level	   projects	   carried	   out	   by	   national	  
governments,	  with	  considerable	  support	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  EU-­‐funded	  bodies,	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  cascading	  EU	  provisions	  at	  the	  community	  level.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  area	  
of	  community	  security	  in	  Kosovo,	  as	  per	  SAP	  outcomes,	  the	  EU	  has	  pledged	  support	  for	  
the	  Action	   Plan	   on	   the	   Implementation	   of	   the	   Strategy	   for	   the	   Integration	   of	   Roma,	  
Ashkali	   and	   Egyptian	   Communities.	   This	   project,	   initiated	   in	   2009	   and	   still	   on-­‐going,	  
also	   sees	   the	   support	   of	   the	   European	  Council’s	   Project	   ‘Cross	  Culture’	   and	  of	   other	  
international	  organisations	  and	  human	  rights	  pressure	  groups.	  The	  importance	  of	  civil	  
society	   has	   been	   recognised	  within	   both	   the	   SAP,	   as	   well	   as	   within	   the	   larger	   CFSP	  
framework.	  Civil	  society	  policy	  recommendations	  have	  influenced	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  by	  
generating	  projects	  that	  have	  considerable	  social	  impact.4	  Nonetheless	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  
emphasis	   on	   civil	   society	   has	   not	   resolved	   the	   tension	   between	   civil	   society	  
development	  as	  an	  end	   in	   itself,	  as	  opposed	  to	  civil	  society	  development	  as	  a	  means	  
for	  approximation	  to	  the	  EU.	  The	  tension	  was	  resolved	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  latter	  with	  civil	  
society	   development	   being	   guided	   by	   immediate	   priorities	   of	   European	   integration.	  
Such	   resolution	   has	   a	   practical	   and	   operational	   rationale.	   The	   SAP,	   with	   its	  
comprehensive	  reformist	  political	  and	  economic	  agenda,	  has	  served	  as	  the	  anchor	  of	  
reforms	  enacted	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  states.	  However,	  it	  also	  reflects	  the	  EU’s	  move	  
to	  prioritise	  member	  state-­‐building,	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  Central	  and	  East	  European	  aspirants	  
to	  the	  EU	  membership,	  as	  opposed	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  state-­‐building,	  which	  would	  entail	  a	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  the	  European	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  (2011)	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  Herzegovina.	  3076th	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  Council	  Meeting,	  Brussels	  21st	  March	  2011.	  p.1.	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much	  broader	   reconstruction	  agenda	   to	   states	  and	   societies	  emerging	   from	  violence	  
and	  destruction.	  	  
Accession	  
With	   the	   signing	   of	   SAA	   agreements	   regionally,	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   EU	   shifted	   towards	  
pre-­‐accession	   instruments	   that	   could	   support	   the	   development	   of	   cross-­‐cutting	  
regional	   cooperation.	  Given	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   clear	   prospect	   for	   accession	   into	  
the	   Union,	   several	  mechanisms	   have	   been	   in	   place	   to	   initiate	   and	   sustain	   accession	  
processes	   in	   the	  Western	  Balkans.	  Amongst	   these	   instruments,	  bi-­‐lateral	  agreements	  
such	   as	   the	   SAA	   have	   the	   purpose	   of	   providing	   a	   framework	   for	   dialogue	   and	  
negotiation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  applicant	  countries.	  
Political	   and	   economic	   dialogues,	   such	   as	   the	   EU-­‐supported	   Dialogue	   between	  
Prishtina	  and	  Belgrade	  also	  represent	  steps	  towards	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  process	  of	  
accession;	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  outcomes	  and	  decisions	  taken	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Dialogue	  
are	   incorporated	   into	   the	   formal	   negotiation	   process	   for	   accession.	   In	   2012,	   the	  
Commission	   introduced	   the	   High	   Level	   Accession	   Dialogue	   in	   FYR	   Macedonia,	  
operating	  through	  the	  meetings	  between	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  
Enlargement,	   which	   further	   extended	   the	   EU’s	   engagement	   with	   the	   local	   political	  
establishment	   to	   prevent	   the	   country’s	   political	   destabilisation	   and	   keep	   it	   on	   the	  
accession	  path.	  	  
These	   mechanisms	   which	   are	   administered	   at	   state-­‐level	   speak	   directly	   to	   the	   EU's	  
capacity-­‐building	   project.	  National	   Programmes	   for	   the	  Adoption	   of	   the	  Acquis,	   for	  
instance,	  more	   specifically	   and	   technically	   establish	   the	   timetable	   and	   the	   resources	  
allocated	  to	  each	  applicant	   in	   its	  accession	  path.	   In	  the	  case	  of	   the	  Western	  Balkans,	  
Instruments	   for	  Pre-­‐Accession	  Assistance	  (IPA)	  have	  replaced	  Community	  Assistance	  
for	   Reconstruction,	   Democratization	   and	   Stabilisation	   (CARDS),	   in	   generating	  
momentum	  and	   financial	   support	   for	   institutional	   reforms,	   and	  encouraging	   regional	  
cooperation.	  
Reform	   implementation	   has	   been	   prioritised	   by	   focusing,	   at	   the	   local	   level,	   on	  
mechanisms	  of	  training	  and	  support,	  which	  aim	  to	  train	  local	  stakeholders	  whilst	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  targeting	  the	  alignment	  of	  local	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  to	  European	  and	  
donor	  standards.	  These	  projects	  address	  to	  an	  extent	  the	   local	   level,	  by	   focussing	  on	  
specific	   areas	  of	  need.	  Technical	  Assistance	  and	   Information	  Exchange	  programmes	  
(TAIEX),	   in	   operation	   since	   1996,	   have	   sought	   to	   address	   particularly	   the	   delivery	   of	  
support,	   are	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer,	   and	   aimed	   at	   short-­‐term	   institutional	   development	   and	  
capacity-­‐building.	   In	   Kosovo,	   for	   instance,	   several	   projects	   have	   seen	   the	   arrival	   of	  
many	   area-­‐specific	   experts	   that	   have	   instructed	   local	   structures	   of	   government	   on	  
issues	   concerning	   justice	   and	   security;	   for	   instance,	   a	   2010	   TAIEX	   project	   saw	   the	  




Impact	   at	   the	   civil	   society	   level	   has	   been	   significantly	  more	   limited.	  Within	   the	   SAA	  
framework,	   the	  EU	  has	   initiated	  and	  carried	  out	  projects	   that	  sought	   to	  enhance	  the	  
participation	   of	   candidate	   countries	   such	   as	   Croatia	   in	   community	   programmes:	   an	  
example	   is	   Tempus5,	   the	   trans-­‐European	   cooperation	   scheme	   for	   higher	   education.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   European	   Commission	   has	   interacted	   with	   civil	   society	   primarily	  
through	   consultations	   aimed	   at	   enhancing	   and	   improving	   donor	   coordination	   and	  
knowledge	  of	  local	  circumstances;	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  
examples	   of	   consultation	   with	   the	   civil	   society	   has	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
dialogue	  on	  visa	  liberalisation.	  	  
CFSP	  
Whilst	   the	   EU	   has	   arguably	   always	   approached	   regional	   security	   policy	   as	   a	   single	  
external	  strategy,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  singular	  body	  of	  the	  European	  
External	  Action	  Service	   (EEAS)	   that	  efforts	  were	  made	   to	   create	  a	  unitary	  diplomatic	  
corpus	  to	  gather	  staff,	  documents	  and	  policies	  from	  the	  Council,	  the	  Commission	  and	  
Member	  States	  under	  one	  umbrella	  entity.	  
Nowhere	  is	  the	  EU’s	  contribution	  to	  security	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  more	  substantial	  
and	   expanded	   than	   in	   the	   area	   of	   Rule	   of	   Law	   and	   Police	   training.	   With	   ground-­‐
breaking	   missions	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   Kosovo,	   EU’s	   strategy	   for	   the	   CFSP	   addressed	   the	  
regional	   aspect	   of	   normalisation	   of	   relations	   by	   tackling	   issues	   such	   as	   cross-­‐border	  
relations	  and	   trafficking.	  The	  EU	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Mission	   in	  Kosovo	   (EULEX),	  deployed	   in	  
2008,	   has	   had	   the	   principle	   purpose	   of	   training	   local	   police,	   fostering	   Prishtina-­‐
Belgrade	   relations,	   gathering	   evidence	   and	   statistical	   information	   on	   human	   rights	  
abuses	  and	  human	  trafficking,	  and	  handling	  high-­‐profile	  war	  crime	  cases.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  strongest	  impact	  of	  security	  provisions	  has	  taken	  place	  at	  the	  state	  
level.	  	  Given	  that	  much	  of	  the	  EU’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  region	  have	  concerned	  strengthening	  
governance	  and	  state	  institutions,	  most	  instruments	  have	  tackled	  the	  issue	  of	  security	  
at	   the	   level	  of	  each	   individual	  state.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  Kosovo,	   the	  SAP-­‐related	  meetings	  
have	  been	  established	  to	  monitor	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  key	  areas	  including	  security	  
and	   justice.	   The	   European	   Union	   has	   engaged	  with	  mechanisms	   that	   address	  more	  
traditional	   aspects	   of	   security	   and	   defence,	   such	   as	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	  
Western	   Balkans	   Defence	   Intelligence	   Chiefs	   (WEBADIC),	   Disaster	   Preparedness	   and	  
Prevention	  Initiative	  for	  South	  East	  Europe	  (DPPI	  SEE),	  and	  South	  Eastern	  and	  Eastern	  
Europe	   Clearinghouse	   for	   the	   Control	   of	   Small	   Arms	   and	   Light	   Weapons	   (SEESAC).	  
Under	   the	   RCC	   framework,	   however,	   security	   activities	   have	   seen	   a	   shift	   away	   from	  
defence	  and	  the	  military	  sector	  “to	  non-­‐military	  areas	  such	  as	  international	  terrorism	  
and	  cross-­‐border	  organised	  crime.”6.	  In	  FYR	  Macedonia,	  the	  EUPOL	  mission	  Concordia	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that	   was	   established	   in	   2001	   to	   secure	   the	   suitable	   environment	   for	   the	  
implementation	   of	   the	   Ohrid	   Agreement	   provisions	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   violence,	  
was	  considerably	  downsized	  in	  2003,	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  EUPOL	  Proxima.	  Likewise,	  
operation	   Althea	   in	   Bosnia	   was	   downsized	   in	   2012,	   and	   now	   mainly	   ensures	   the	  
provision	   of	   capacity-­‐building	   activities	   such	   as	   monitoring	   and	   support	   (EU	   CSDP	  
Althea	  Factsheet,	   2015).	  Within	   the	   current	  RCC	   framework,	   the	  emphasis	   is	   instead	  
placed	   on	   enhancing	   the	   resilience	   of	   regional	   bodies	   in	   the	   disaster	   risk	   reduction	  
area	   (Regional	  Cooperation	  Council	   2014).	   	   In	  Kosovo,	  EULEX,	  has	  dedicated	   itself	   to	  
training	   of	   police	   and	   judges,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   enhance	   inter-­‐ethnic	   cooperation	   at	   the	  
institutional	  level.	  EULEX	  also	  evidences	  an	  involvement	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  through	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  specialised	  unit,	  the	  Religious	  and	  Cultural	  Heritage	  (RCHS)	  Unit,	  to	  
“comply	  with	  ethnic	  minority	  safety	  concerns”,	   in	  areas	  concerning	  the	  protection	  of	  
cultural	   and	   religious	   rights.	   The	   table	   below	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	  main	   EU	  
policy	   instruments	   applied	   in	   the	   Western	   Balkans,	   in	   terms	   of	   primary	   level	   of	  
engagement,	  namely	  regional,	  state,	  local	  government	  and	  civil	  society.	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The	   Outcomes	   of	   EU	   Policy	   in	   the	   Western	   Balkans:	   Subversion,	  
Unintended	  Consequences	  and	  Qualified	  Success	  
The	   peacebuilding	   literature	   has	   devoted	   relatively	   scant	   attention	   to	   the	   strategies	  
local	   actors	   use	   to	   negotiate	   international	   interventions,	   and	   to	   the	   distinct	  ways	   in	  
which	   they	   adapt	   both	   to	   the	   emergent	   constraints	   as	   well	   as	   opportunities,	   by	  
mobilising	   their	   social	  networks	   to	   that	  end	   (Zahar	  2003).	  A	  preference	   for	  engaging	  
with	   formal	   institution	  and	   institutional	  processes	   leaves	   those	  practices	  outside	   the	  
cognitive	  and	  instrumental	  purview	  of	  EU	  intervention.	  Consequently,	  a	  strict	  focus	  on	  
the	  institutionalisation	  of	  ethnic	  co-­‐operation	  between	  different	  groups	  in	  the	  Western	  
Balkans	   may	   have	   obscured	   the	   processes	   of	   inter-­‐ethnic	   relationality	   that	   are	   not	  
formally	   included	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   analysis,	   and	   that	   exist	   beyond	   the	   formal	  
structures	   and	   procedures	   set	   up	   to	   foster	   inter-­‐ethnic	   dialogue.	   Traditionally,	   then,	  
any	  progress	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  security	  is	  attributed	  to	  these	  frameworks	  that	  spell	  
out	  provisions	  for	  ethnic	   inclusion,	  thus	  establishing	  and	  reinforcing	  the	  necessity	  for	  
the	  securitisation	  of	  identities	  with	  a	  knock	  on	  effect	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  reconciliation	  
and	  peacebuilding.	  
Peacebuilding	  from	  a	  Conflict	  Network	  Perspective	  
We	  adopt	  a	  conflict	  network7	  perspective	  to	  analyse	  three	  outcomes	  of	  the	  EU	  policy	  
in	   the	   Western	   Balkans:	   subversion,	   unintended	   effect,	   and	   qualified	   success.	   The	  
conflict	  network	  approach	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  relational	  turn	  in	  the	  critical	  peacebuilding	  
literature.	  It	  is	  an	  agential	  perspective,	  in	  that	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  networks	  on	  
peacebuilding	  outcomes,	  by	  analysing	  relations	  rather	  than	  actors	  or	  categories.	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  external	  intervention	  such	  as	  by	  the	  EU,	  it	  takes	  an	  alternative	  view	  to	  the	  
Weberian	   conception	  of	   state	   capacity	   focused	  on	   functionality	  and	   resources	  which	  
informs	   the	   EU	   peacebuilding/	   state	   building	   approach.	   Instead,	   from	   a	   relational	  
perspective,	  state	  capacity	  is	  reconceptualised	  as	  a	  structure	  of	  local	  power	  relations.	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  state	  “as	  ideally	  divorced	  from	  politics,	  
economics,	   and	   society”	   (Wesley	  2008,	  380),	  which	   is	  particularly	  problematic	   in	   the	  
light	  of	  deep	  social	   transformation	  associated	  with	  violent	  conflict	  engaging	  different	  
sections	   of	   the	   local	   society.	   Understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   war-­‐related	   social	  
transformation	   is	   therefore	   a	   quintessential	   precondition	   for	   building	   an	   effective	  
strategy	  to	  assist	  post-­‐conflict	  peacebuilding.	  
The	   following	  analyses	  also	  builds	  on	   the	   local	   turn	   in	   the	  peacebuilding	  scholarship.	  
The	  local	  context	  is	  thus	  a	  key	  site	  and	  perspective	  through	  which	  the	  external	  policies	  
are	   understood	   and	   engaged	   with.	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	   top-­‐down	  
perspectives,	   embodied	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   criticism	   of	   liberal	   peace-­‐	   and	   state-­‐	  
building	  as	  neo-­‐colonial	  practices.	  It	  is	  a	  normative	  perspective,	  in	  that	  local	  networks	  
can	   have	   both	   a	   beneficial	   and	  malign	   effect.	   The	   normativity	   of	   the	   peacebuilding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Conflict	  networks	  are	  understood	  as	  structured	  relations	  among	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  local	  and	  
international,	  forged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war.	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agenda	  is	  focused	  on	  identifying	  an	  emancipatory	  form	  of	  local	  agency,	  enhancing	  the	  
well-­‐being	  of	  the	  local	  population,	  which	  ought	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  possibility	  that	  this	  will	  
not	  be	  aligned	  neatly	  with	   liberal	  prescription	  of	   liberal	  peacebuilding.	  Lastly,	  conflict	  
networks	  are	  embedded	  in	  local	  power	  relations	  and	  the	  trajectory	  of	  conflict	  (Bojicic-­‐	  
Dzelilovic	   and	   Kostovicova	   2012).	   Hence,	   our	   focus	   on	   conflict	   networks	   takes	   into	  
account	  a	  long	  term	  perspective	  on	  their	  development.	  	  
In	   sum,	  we	   show	   that	   the	   EU	   intervention	   in	   the	  Western	  Balkans	   has	   overlooked	   a	  
particular	   configuration	   of	   conflict	   networks	   shaped	   by	   a	   symbiotic	   relation	   among	  
military,	  security-­‐intelligence	  agents,	  political	  elites	  and	  organized	  crime	  elements	  that	  
developed	   under	   the	   cover	   of	   war	   –	   	   but	   within	   thickening	   webs	   of	   relations	   with	  
official	  business,	  diasporas,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  as	  well	  as	   local	  religious	  
institutions	  –	  and	  how	  those	  structures	  have	  adapted	  since.	  These	  networks	  influence	  
and	  have	  a	  considerable	   impact	  on	   those	  very	  social	  processes	   that	   the	  EU	  wants	   to	  
address	   as	   part	   of	   its	   member	   state	   building	   agenda.	   Thus	   when	   considering	   EU	  
discourse	   on	   security,	   and	   particularly	   that	   of	   justice	   and	   policing	   for	   example,	   a	  
narrow	  focus	  on	  enhancing	  inter-­‐ethnic	  police	  recruitment	  may	  have	  limited	  effect	  in	  
unsettling	   the	   resilience	  of	  wartime	  structures	  which	   remain	  engaged	   in	   the	  struggle	  
for	  power	   and	   resources.	   Consequently,	   understanding	  how	   those	  networks	  operate	  
and	  engage	  with	  externally	  imposed	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  Stabilisation	  and	  Association	  
Process/Association	  Process,	  requires	  their	  detailed	  deconstruction	  to	   identify	  modes	  
and	   mechanisms	   of	   their	   operation.	   The	   network	   analysis	   allows	   us	   to	   capture	   the	  
intricate	   and	   enduring	   character	   of	   relations	   developed	   through	   war-­‐time	   violence,	  
which	   are	   sustained	   and	   reworked	   in	   response	   to	   the	   international	   peacebuilding	  
efforts.	  The	  three	  case	  studies	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  EU	  policy	  –	  when	  it	  encounters	  a	  
networked	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  authority	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  –	  produces	  three	  type	  
of	  outcomes:	  subversion,	  unintended	  consequences	  and	  a	  qualified	  success.	  	  
Hybrid	  Development:	  Subversion	  of	  the	  formal	  institutional	  process	  
The	  support	  to	  economic	  rehabilitation	  has	  occupied	  a	  much	  more	  prominent	  role	   in	  
the	  EU’s	  approach	  to	  peacebuilding	  since	  the	  Thessaloniki	  Summit,	  which	  confirmed	  a	  
commitment	  to	  include	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  into	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  strategy.	  While	  
the	   SAP	   framework	   alongside	   a	   range	   of	   supplementary	   instruments	   at	   the	   national	  
and	   regional	   level	   has	   been	   adapted	   to	   address	   the	   Western	   Balkans’	   specific	  
circumstances	   and	   needs,	   the	   EU	   approach	   to	   building	   competitive	   open	   market	  
economies	  based	  on	  private	  sector	  development	  has	  followed	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  
previous	   rounds	  of	   enlargement.	   The	  EU’s	  market	   enhancing	   agenda	  entails	   a	   set	   of	  
policy	   reforms	   that	   aim	   to	   strengthen	   the	   state’s	   regulatory	   capacity,	   including	   to	  
create	  business	  environments	  conducive	  to	  private	  sector	  growth.	  In	  parallel,	  it	  places	  
strong	   emphasis	   on	   the	   privatisation	   of	   state	   assets	   as	   a	   direct	   channel	   for	   private	  
enterprise	  creation.	  The	  main	  benchmarks	  to	  assess	  progress	  towards	  an	  open	  market	  
economy	   included	   in	   the	   EC’s	   annual	   SAP	   progress	   reports	   are	   derived	   from	   the	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Copenhagen	  economic	  criteria.	  They	  cover	  three	  main	  aspects,	  namely:	  the	  progress	  in	  
the	  adoption	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  EU-­‐mandated	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  and	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  relevant	  governance	  bodies	  that	  when	  combined,	  constitute	  
the	   institutional	  architecture	  of	  a	  market	  economy.	  The	  benchmarks	  as	   such	  are	  not	  
exact,	   and	   assessment	   of	   progress	   is	   susceptible	   to	   the	   EU’s	   own	   judgment,	   often	  
informed	  by	  calculations	  which	  reflect	  political	  agendas.	  
In	   Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina	   the	   policy	   reforms	   to	   strengthen	   private	   sector	   growth	   have	  
been	   pursued	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   ongoing	   contestation	   among	   the	   three	   main	  
ethnic	   groups	   over	   the	   state	   and	   the	   powers	   vested	   in	   various	   government	   levels,	  
including	   in	   the	   area	   of	   economic	   policy	   making.	   While	   this	   has	   undoubtedly	  
determined	  the	  pace	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  policy	  reforms-­‐	  the	  two	  aspects	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  
the	   EU	   SAP	   assessment	   exercise-­‐	   the	   consideration	   of	   what	   kind	   of	   private	   sector	  
growth	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  consequence	  has	  received	  far	   less	  scrutiny.	  At	  best,	  such	  a	  
concern	   is	   expressed	   in	   frequent	   reference	   to	   corruption,	   and	   a	   large	   informal	  
economy	   as	   the	  manifestation	   of	   a	   ‘pathology’	   accompanying	   Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina’s	  
nascent	   market	   economy,	   with	   consequences	   on	   overall	   market	   competitiveness	  
(Belloni	   and	   Strazzari	   2014;	   	   Blagovcanin	   and	   Divjak	   2015).	   The	   main	   policy	   reform	  
focus	  is	  consistent	  in	  its	  pursuit	  of	  macroeconomic	  stability,	  removal	  of	  administrative	  
barriers	  and	  alleviation	  of	  financial	  constraints	  to	  the	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  small-­‐
and-­‐medium-­‐sized	  firms.	  	  
	  The	   approach	   to	   private	   sector	   development,	   seconded	   by	   the	   main	   international	  
financial	   institutions	   including	   the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	   the	  World	  Bank,	  
has	   been	   pursued	   as	   an	   apolitical	   process	   of	   institution	   building	   devoid	   of	  
consideration	   for	   how	   political	   and	   economic	   powers	   are	   organised	   in	   post-­‐conflict	  
Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   policies	   in	   support	   of	   private	   sector	  
development	   have	   disproportionately	   benefited	   particular	   groups	   and	   interests	  
operating	  through	  multiple	  informal	  networks	  which	  link	  political	  and	  economic	  actors	  
inside	  Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina	  and	  transnationally.	  	  This	  has	  occurred	  in	  parallel	  to	  Bosnia-­‐	  
Herzegovina	  making	  progress,	  albeit	  overall	  halting	  and	  uneven,	  on	  all	   key	  economic	  
benchmarks	   used	   as	   part	   of	   the	   SAP	   monitoring	   exercise.	   A	   case	   in	   point	   is	   an	  
impressive	  record	  of	   the	   ‘regulatory	  guillotine	  reform’,	   	   intended	  to	  cut	   the	  red	  tape	  
and	  facilitate	  private	  sector	  development-­‐	  pursued	  particularly	  efficiently	  in	  Republika	  
Srpska-­‐	   which	   has	   not	   been	   commensurate	   with	   the	   private	   enterprise	   growth	  
outcomes	  (Penev	  2015).	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  in	  each	  of	  Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina’s	  three	  main	  
ethnic	   groups,	   distinct	   configurations	   of	   politico-­‐economic	   elites	   have	   been	  
opportunistically	  engaged	  in	  responding	  to	  market	  enhancing	  reforms	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  
have	  been	  able	  to	  influence	  the	  pace	  of	  reforms,	  and	  to	  subvert	  their	  principal	  goal	  of	  
building	   institutional	   foundations	   of	   an	   open,	   functioning	   market	   economy	   to	   the	  
benefit	  of	  particular	  group	  interests.	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The	   analysis	   conducted	   by	   two	   authors	   of	   this	   paper	   (Bojicic-­‐	   Dzelilovic	   and	  
Kostovicova	  2013)	  of	  one	  such	  network8	  originating	   in	   the	  1992-­‐1995	  conflict,	  brings	  
together	  some	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Croat	  most	  prominent	  elites	  and	  organisations,	  captures	  
the	  mechanics	   of	   their	   operation	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   private	   sector	   growth	   in	   Bosnia-­‐	  
Herzegovina	   has	   been	   accompanied	   by	   the	   business	   practices	   that	   distort	   market	  
competition,	   undermine	   the	   government’s	   tax	   base,	   and	   favour	   narrow	   private	  
interests.	  Although	  the	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  network’s	  mechanics	  covers	  the	  period	  
prior	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  SAP,	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  how	  informal	  networks	  emerging	  
from	   Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina	   war	   have	   adapted	   in	   the	   course	   of	   EU-­‐	   assisted	  
peacebuilding	  are	  nevertheless	  relevant,	  not	  least	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  their	  
protagonists	  still	  wield	  political	  and	  economic	  power.9	  	  The	  example	  of	  this	  network	  is	  
emblematic	  of	  the	  ‘symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  crime,	  business	  and	  politics’	  which	  
the	   Feasibility	   Study	   for	   the	   SAP	   identified	   among	   the	   major	   challenges	   to	   the	  
European	   Union	   accession	   agenda	   in	   Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina.	   Although	   this	   problem	   is	  
acknowledged,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  effectively	  addressed	  by	  the	  EU	  policies	  toward	  private	  
sector	   development,	   which	   attribute	   its	   persistence	   to,	   and	   conflate	   it	   with,	   the	  
incidence	  of	  corruption.	  To	  deal	  with	  corruption,	  a	  standard	  set	  of	  policy	  instruments	  
to	  strengthen	  good	  government	   is	  supported	  through	  a	  range	  of	   instruments	  applied	  
at	   the	  national	  and	  regional	   level,	   focused	   foremost	  at	  various	  governing	  bodies	  and	  
public	  administration	  structures.	  	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  international	  community’s	  efforts	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  
High	  Representative	  to	  cut	  the	  informal	  flows	  of	  funding	  from	  Croatia	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  
Croat	   parallel	   structures	   which	   were	   obstructing	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   peace	  
agreement,	  in	  1997	  this	  network	  set	  up	  the	  Hercegovina	  Holding-­‐	  a	  sprawling	  business	  
structure	  through	  which	  financial	  and	  commercial	  flows	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  Croat	  majority	  
areas	  were	  to	  be	  controlled.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  this	  structure	  was	  Hercegovacka	  Banka,	  one	  
of	   the	   best	   performing	   commercial	   banks	   at	   the	   time.	   Financial	   sector	   liberalisation	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  early	  economic	  reforms	  which	  facilitated	  private	  ownership	  in	  Bosnia-­‐	  
Herzegovina	   banking	   sector	   which	   spurred	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   banks	   in	   the	  
country.	   In	   the	   Holding’s	   portfolio	   were	   some	   of	   the	   most	   lucrative	   enterprises	   in	  
Bosnia-­‐	   Herzegovina	   in	   sectors	   as	   varied	   as	   construction,	   oil,	   trade	   and	  
telecommunications.	   	   The	   control	   of	   the	   financial	   flows	   within	   the	   Bosnian	   Croat-­‐	  
majority	  areas	  was	  exercised	  through	  a	  web	  of	  interconnected	  actors	  and	  institutions	  
located	  across	  the	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  arenas.	  Benefiting	  from	  those	  transactions	  were	  
the	  groups	  conjoined	  through	  the	  Bosnian	  Croat	  political	  autonomy	  agenda.	  The	  core	  
of	   this	   network	   constituted	   public	   officials,	   military	   personnel	   and	   businessmen	  
actively	  engaged	  in	  co-­‐opting	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  institutions.	  The	  network	  members	  
enjoyed	   privileged	   access	   to	   assets	   and	   opportunities	   created	   through	   market-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  empirical	  studies	  that	  details	  the	  mechanics	  of	  network	  operation	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  post-­‐conflict	  statebuilding.	  
9	  See	  for	  example:	  Veza	  Dzaferovica	  i	  Covica-­‐	  kako	  su	  otkupljivani	  krediti	  firme	  Soko	  od	  Razvojne	  banke,	  
November	  2015.	  http://www.nap.ba/new/vijest.php?id=18125	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enhancing	   reforms.	   Access	   to	   credit	   for	   business	   development	   through	   the	  
Hercegovacka	  Banka	  was	  often	  granted	  along	  the	  clientelist	  lines,	  on	  privileged	  terms,	  
and	  in	  breach	  of	  due	  diligence	  such	  as	  collateral	  requirements	  (Bojicic-­‐	  Dzelilovic	  and	  
Kostovicova	   2013,	   ibid).	   The	   Bank’s	   enforcement	   of	   loan	   repayments	   was	   similarly	  
arbitrary.	   Such	   practices	   were	   often	   combined	   with	   the	   bail	   outs	   of	   insolvent	  
companies	   of	   interest	   to	   the	   network,	   which	   amounted	   to	   market	   competition	  
distorting	  practices.	   Those	  practices	   took	  place	  despite	   a	   regulatory	  oversight	   of	   the	  
Bank	   by	   the	   Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina	   Federation	   Banking	  Agency,	   and	   the	   Bank’s	   formal	  
compliance	  with	   the	   prescribed	   operating	   standards.	   In	   the	   areas	   controlled	   by	   this	  
network,	   such	   practices	   which	   created	   unfair	   competition	   worked	   as	   deterrents	   to	  	  
new	  market	  entrants	  while	  creating	  incentives	  for	  the	  legally	  registered	  companies	  to	  
move	   to	   the	   informal	   sphere	   or	   exit	   the	   market	   altogether.	   Furthermore	   the	  
arbitrariness	  and	  unpredictability	  in	  enforcing	  relevant	  regulations	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
informal	  business	  practices	   involving	  the	  network,	  had	  far	   reaching	  consequences	  on	  
the	  rule	  of	  law,	  further	  reinforcing	  disincentives	  to	  private	  sector	  development	  –	  given	  
the	  importance	  of	  stable	  rules	  and	  regulations	  for	  business	  planning	  and	  development.	  
The	  consequence	  of	  a	  narrow	  formal	  production	  base	  and	  large	  informal	  economy	  was	  
manifested	   in	   the	   reduced	   public	   revenue	   generating	   capacity	   of	   the	   Bosnia-­‐	  
Herzegovina	   state.	   The	   gatekeeping	   practices	   of	   the	   (ethnic)	   networks	   of	   politico-­‐
business	   elites,	   often	   accompanied	   by	   the	   instances	   of	   blatant	   corruption	   involving	  
public	   office	   holders	   and	   business	   actors	   alike,	   and	   coupled	  with	  many	   instances	   of	  
privatisation	   failures,	   have	   been	   major	   factors	   in	   shaping	   the	   private	   sector	  
development	  in	  post-­‐war	  Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  
open	  competitive	  market	  as	  intended	  by	  the	  economic	  reforms	  supported	  by	  the	  EU	  in	  
Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina	  has	  been	  consequently	  undermined.	  	  
Such	   an	   outcome	   reflects	   the	   inability	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   adapt	   its	   approach	   to	   market	  
reforms	   to	   effectively	   address	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   war-­‐	   time	   predatory	   political	  
economy,	   and	   its	   adaptation	   to	  new	  opportunities	  provided	   in	   the	   context	  of	   liberal	  
economic	   reforms.	   The	   EU	   approach	   presupposes	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   willing	   and	  
committed	  local	  political	  and	  economic	  constituency,	  but	  in	  fact	  encounters	  the	  elites	  
that	  selectively	  pursue	  those	  reform	  elements	  that	  do	  not	  threaten	  their	  interests.	  The	  
result	   has	   been	   the	   emergence	   of	   hybrid	   forms	   of	   development	   whereby	   a	   small	  
number	   of	   well-­‐	   connected,	   rent	   seeking	   individuals	   and	   groups	   have	   been	   able	   to	  
capture	  large	  swathes	  of	  the	  local	  economy10	  and	  where	  informal	  economic	  practices	  
operate	  as	  a	  norm.	  This	  general	  pattern	  is	  present	  across	  the	  broader	  region;	  Bartlett	  
argues	   in	   relation	   to	   privatisation	   that	   “[t]he	   anti-­‐	   market	   consequences	   of	   passing	  
state	   and	   social	   property	   over	   to	   narrow	   economic	   elites	   with	   strong	   political	  
connections	   to	   incumbent	   ruling	   parties	   have	   not	   been	   sufficiently	   addressed	   and	  
remain	  a	  stumbling	  block	  to	  EU	  membership”	  (Bartlett	  2015:224).	  While	  Bartlett	  refers	  
explicitly	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   privatisation,	   his	   diagnosis	   applies	   more	   broadly	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Michael	  Pugh	  (2015)	  refers	  to	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  the	  ‘pyramid	  of	  oligarchs’.	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consequences	   of	   the	  market	   enhancing	   policies	   as	   highlighted	   by	   Pugh	   (2015,	   Ibid.),	  
which	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  building	  yet	  more	  of	  “toothless	  institutions”	  in	  the	  context	  
where	   informal	   networks	   are	   the	   real	   power	   wielders	   (Bartlett	   2015,	   Ibid.;	   also	  
Stanojevic	   at	   al.	   2015).	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   pockets	   of	   genuine	  
entrepreneurship	   whose	   strength	   is	   insufficient	   to	   shoulder	   the	   development	   of	   a	  
diversified	  and	  broad	  based	  economy	  which	  EU	  assistance	  is	  supposed	  to	  help	  build	  as	  
a	  foundation	  for	  generating	  growth	  and	  employment	  –	  the	  two	  economic	  goals	  of	  the	  
foremost	  concern	  to	  the	  local	  population.	  	  	  	  	  
Hybrid	  Security:	  Unintended	  consequences	  of	  institutional	  reform	  
The	   EU’s	   approach	   to	   Europeanisation	   has	   hinged	   upon	   processes	   of	  
institutionalisation	  understood	  as	   the	  adoption	  of	   formal	  and	   informal	   criteria	   in	   the	  
social	   context	  of	   the	   recipient	   State.	   The	  understanding	  of	   contested	   statehood	  as	  a	  
principal	  source	  of	  conflict	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  decade	  long	  approach	  to	  securitisation	  
that	  seeks	  to	  create	  and	  promote	  the	  spread	  of	  a	  specific	  European	  ‘security	  culture’	  
(Dolghi	  and	  Oliva,	  2011:	  108).	  A	  shared	  sense	  of	  security,	  it	  is	  suggested,	  is	  important	  
particularly	   to	   foster	   reconciliation	   and	   facilitate	   the	   processes	   of	   post-­‐war	  
reconstruction.	  Distinctively	   the	  promotion	  of	   the	  European	  security	  community	  acts	  
with	   a	   threefold	   purpose:	   1)	   as	   a	   peacekeeping	   force,	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	  
military	   missions;	   2)	   as	   political	   destination	   for	   the	   Western	   Balkan	   states	   (Cierco,	  
2013:	  430);	  and	  3)	  as	  a	  technical	  exercise	  in	  institution	  building.	  In	  this	  multi-­‐pronged	  
framework,	   the	  EU	  does	  not	   limit	   itself	   to	  addressing	  a	  traditional	  aspect	  of	  security,	  
(the	  military	   one),	   but	   rather	   relies	   almost	   entirely	   on	   its	   ‘normative	   power’	   as	   the	  
panacea	  to	  tackle	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  ailments.	  
Since	  its	  inception	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  framework	  for	  Defence	  and	  Security	  in	  the	  1990s,	  
the	  process	  of	  spreading	  European	  norms	  to	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  has	  been	  marred	  by	  
unsteady	  progress,	  weak	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  occasional	  recurrence	  of	  violence.	  These	  
problems	  have	  usually	  been	  attributed	  to	  lack	  of	  norm	  assimilation	  and	  poor	  capacity	  
(Bieber,	   2011:1785),	   thus	   calling	   for	   further	   reinforcement	   of	   mechanisms	   that	  
monitor,	   support	   and	   enhance	   said	   capacity.	   	   With	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   clear	  
prospect	   for	   enlargement	   of	   the	   EU	   into	   the	   Balkans	   in	   2003,	   attempts	   have	   been	  
made	   to	   re-­‐wire	   the	   approach	   to	   justice	   and	   security	   at	   the	   state	   level,	   to	   reflect	   a	  
concern	   for	   security	   threats	   different	   from	   that	   of	   the	   early	   2000s	   (characterised	  by	  
the	   fear	   of	   immediate	   violence).	   However,	   this	   section	   will	   suggest	   that	   within	   an	  
unchanged	   foreign	   policy	   framework	   that	   had	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   European	   efforts	   for	  
peace-­‐building	  in	  the	  Balkans	  of	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  cemented	  later	  on	  in	  the	  Defence	  
and	   Foreign	   Policy	   approach,	   the	   EU’s	   efforts	   post-­‐Thessaloniki	   continued	   to	   be	  
underpinned	  by	  an	  ethnicised	  understanding	  of	  security	  threats.	  	  
EU	   policies	   have	   reflected,	   despite	   shifts	   in	   operationalization	   and	   sequencing,	   a	  
concern	  for	  the	  dangerous	  potential	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  and	  its	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	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institutions	   of	   these	   reforming	   countries.	   This	   concern	   is	   visible,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	  
manner	   in	   which	   normalisation	   of	   relations	   between	   Prishtina	   and	   Belgrade	   at	   the	  
regional	  level	  has	  become	  a	  fundamental	  pinnacle	  of	  state-­‐specific	  and	  local	  projects,	  
for	   instance	   by	   representing	   one	   of	   four	   pillars	   of	   EULEX’s	   rule	   of	   law	   mission	   in	  
Kosovo.11	   In	   this	   case	   it	   is	   implied	   that	  any	  potential	  political	  disagreement	  between	  
the	   two	   polities	   represents	   a	   regional	   security	   threat	   and	   a	   hindrance	   to	   the	  
institutional	   development	   of	   Kosovo;	   in	   particular,	   the	   Council	   has	   often	   urged	  both	  
parties	  to	  respect	  the	  commitment	  to	  normalisation	  outlined	  in	  the	  Dialogue	  in	  order	  
to	   make	   “further	   progress	   on	   this	   point,	   including	   irreversible	   progress	   towards	  
delivering	  structures	  in	  northern	  Kosovo	  which	  meet	  the	  security	  and	  justice	  needs	  of	  
the	  local	  population.”12	  
The	  concern	   for	   the	  perils	  of	  ethnic	  competition	  has	  become	  entrenched	   in	   the	  EU’s	  
narrative	  on	  accession	  and	   in	  EU	  policy	   towards	  pre-­‐accession	  states,	  where	  political	  
lines	  of	   contestation	  have	  been	   tied	   to	   the	  potential	   for	   the	   re-­‐emergence	  of	  ethnic	  
tensions	   between	   ethnicities,13	   without	   much	   explanation	   of	   what	   other	   factors,	  
including	  ailing	  economic	  prospects,	  may	  be	  contributing	  to	  the	  unrest.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
the	  FYR	  Macedonia	  (the	  first	  Western	  Balkan	  country	  to	  sign	  the	  SAA	  in	  2001)	  despite	  
progresses	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  public	  administration	  reform	  and	  regional	  cooperation,	  and	  
despite	   consistent	   “high	   level	   of	   alignment	   with	   the	   aquis,”14	   the	   EU	   has	   identified	  
what	   it	   perceives	   to	   be	   elements	   of	   backsliding	   in	   several	   crucial	   areas	   that	   have	  
slowed	  down	  the	  progress	  towards	  accession.	  The	  concerns	  identified	  relate	  primarily	  
to	   elements	   of	   institutional	   weakness	   that	   testify	   to	   Macedonia’s	   fragility	   both	  
structurally	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  democratic	  processes	  of	  the	  state,	  
which	   are	   identified	   as	   marred	   by	   “increasing	   politicisation”,	   problems	   of	   media	  
freedom,	  and	   inter-­‐ethnic	  mistrust.	  The	  politicisation	  of	  state	   institutions,	  the	  EU	  has	  
suggested,	   has	   caused	   their	   erosion,	   and	   has	   highlighted	   that	   in	   Macedonia	   party	  
interests	   supersede	   the	  national	   interest.	  Given	   the	   reiteration	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  
the	  Ohrid	  Agreement	  as	  the	   ideal	  model	  for	  good	  democracy	   in	  Macedonia,	  the	  EU’s	  
concern	   for	   the	  politicisation	  of	  political	  parties	   in	  Macedonia	   implies	   the	  belief	   that	  
contestation	   (paradoxically	   the	   fulcrum	   of	   western	   liberal	   democracy)	   is	   dangerous	  
because	   it	   is	   potentially	   explosive	   and	   violent.	   It	   is	   unclear,	   for	   instance,	   why	   the	  
politicisation	  of	  parties	  in	  Macedonia	  could	  be	  any	  more	  dangerous	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  
democratic	   institutions,	   than	   any	   other	   form	   of	   party	   politicisation	   elsewhere	   in	  
Europe.	  Furthermore	  the	  EU’s	  preference	  for	  an	  ethno-­‐centric	  vision	  of	  politics	  in	  FYR	  
Macedonia	   is	  evident	  also	   in	   its	  choice	  not	   to	  de-­‐emphasise	   the	  role	  ethnicity	  has	   to	  
play;	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   murder	   of	   an	   ethnically	   Albanian	   youth	   in	   2012,	   the	   EU	   –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11EULEX	  Kosovo	  (n.d.)	  Support	  to	  Prishtina-­‐Belgrade	  Dialogue.	  http://www.eulex-­‐
kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/Anglisht_Dialog_1.pdf	  
12Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2012)	  3210th	  GENERAL	  AFFAIRS	  Council	  meeting	  Brussels,	  11	  
December	  2012.	  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/134234.pdf	  
13European	  Commission	  (2014)	  The	  Former	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia:	  Progress	  Report.	  	  
14European	  Commission	  (2014)	  The	  Former	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia:	  Progress	  Report.	  p.	  1	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despite	  acknowledging	  the	  non-­‐ethnic	  motivation	  of	  the	  murder	  –	  chose	  to	  continue	  to	  
assume	   that	   the	   event	   had	   played	   a	   big	   role	   in	   sparking	   the	   ethnic	   mistrust	   that	  
followed.15	  	  
When	   the	   institutional	   framework	   cements	   and	   reiterates	   the	   ethnic	   narrative	   that	  
understands	   any	   form	   of	   contestation,	   violence	   and	   instability	   as	   essentially	   tied	   to	  
matters	   of	   ethnicity	   and	   identity,	   social	   cleavages	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   aligning	   to	   such	  
existing	  and	  continuing	  narrative.	  Ethnic	  elites	  not	  only	  benefit	  from	  such	  an	  approach,	  
but	   actively	   reproduce	  a	   situation	   in	  which	   (in)security	   is	   defined	   foremost	   in	   ethnic	  
terms.	   Community	   strains	   are	   often,	   for	   instance,	   understood	   to	   be	   associated	  with	  
ethnically	   motivated	   tensions,	   rather	   than	   symptomatic	   of	   larger	   cross-­‐cutting	  
economic	  concerns	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  employment.	  In	  Kosovo	  and	  in	  Bosnia-­‐	  Herzegovina	  
various	  surveys	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  such	  cross-­‐cutting	  issues	  reflect	  more	  closely	  
local	   opinion	   on	   the	   sources	   of	   insecurity.16	   Since	   tensions	   are	   understood	   as	  
expressing	   themselves	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ethnic	   competition	   over	   land,	   resources	   and	  
power,	  the	  EU’s	  response	  has	  sought	  to	  rebuild	  apolitical,	  non-­‐ideological	  institutions;	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  police	  force	  in	  Bosnia,	  attempts	  have	  been	  geared	  
to	   ensuring	   the	   preference	   of	   different	   ethnic	   groups	   in	   order	   to	   foster	   the	   view	   of	  
Bosnian	   society	   as	   one	   that	   is	   no	   longer	   disrupted	   by	   division	   and	   reflects	   a	  
commitment	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   (Merlingen	   and	   Ostrauskaite,	  
2006:19).	   In	  Bosnia,	   the	  post-­‐Dayton	  policing	  structure,	  made	  up	  of	   four	  overarching	  
police	  agencies	  [the	  State	  Border	  Service	  (SBS),	  the	  State	  Investigation	  and	  Protection	  
Agency	  (SIPA),	  the	  judicial	  police	  and	  the	  financial	  police]	  has	  attempted	  to	  consolidate	  
institutional	  unity	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  public	  consistently	  tends	  to	  trust	  
more	   the	   police	   force	   dominated	   by	   its	   own	   ethnicity.	   The	   fact	   that	   in	   local	  
communities	   individuals	   who	   were	   involved	   in	   perpetrating	   violence	   against	   other	  
ethnic	  groups	  are	  at	  large-­‐	  some	  even	  as	  public	  office	  holders-­‐	  and	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
keep	   the	   influence	   and	   wealth	   accumulated	   in	   the	   course	   of	   war,	   is	   an	   important	  
contributing	   factor.	  The	  grip	  of	   the	   informal	  networks	  originating	   in	  war	  encroaching	  
on	   formal	   governing	   structures	   is	   even	   firmer	   in	  many	   local	   ethnically	   homogenised	  
communities,	   and	   feeds	   the	   public	   preference	   for	   security	   provided	   by	   one’s	   own	  
ethnicity.	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  hybrid	  security	  whereby	  the	  informality	  associated	  with	  an	  
arbitrary	   exercise	   of	   power,	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   ethnic	   identity	   protection	   which	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Hybrid	  Justice:17	  A	  qualified	  success	  of	  a	  policy	  change	  	  
Drawing	   on	   Mac	   Ginty	   (2011),	   this	   section	   proposes	   hybrid	   justice	   in	   the	   Western	  
Balkans,	   defined	   in	   this	   case	   as	   justice	   without	   reconciliation.	   The	   pursuit	   of	  
transitional	   justice,	   initially	   outside	   the	   region	   of	   the	   Western	   Balkans,	   at	   the	  
International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   former	   Yugoslavia	   (ICTY),	   and	   then	   increasingly	  
through	   domestic	   and	   hybrid	   (domestic-­‐international)	   trials,	   has	   not	   been	  
accompanied	   by	   reconciliation	   in	   the	   region.	   Different	   ethnic	   groups	   tend	   to	   see	  
themselves	  primarily	  as	  victims	  rather	  than	  also	  as	  perpetrators	  of	  crimes	  committed	  
during	   the	   wars	   that	   accompanied	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia;	   nor	   is	  
there	   consensus	   on	   the	   causes	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   violence,	   or	   on	   the	   appropriate	  
redress	  for	  past	  wrongs	  (Kostovicova	  2013a).	  	  
This,	  however,	  should	  not	  overshadow	  limited	  achievements	  of	  the	  ICTY.	  Although	  the	  
trials	  have	  been	  contested	  by	  ethnic	  groups,	  they	  have	  prevented	  a	  blanket	  denial	  of	  
war	   crimes.	   This	   has	   now	   been	   replaced	   by	   what	   Cohen	   (2000)	   has	   called	   the	  
interpretive	   denial,	   as	   ethnic	   groups	   interpret	   the	   facts	   of	   crimes	   to	   fit	   in	  with	   their	  
ethnic	   narratives	   of	   the	   war.	   ICTY’s	   impact	   is	   linked	   to	   broader	   trends	   of	  
democratization,	   including	  freedom,	  ability	  and	  space	  to	  discuss	  the	  responsibility	  for	  
war	   crimes,	   both	   within	   and	   between	   ethnic	   groups	   (Ostojic	   2014;	   Gordy	   2013;	  
Nettelfield	  2012).	  Although	  the	  ICTY’s	  overall	  strategy	  only	  affected	  the	  ‘big	  fry’,	  it	  did	  
nonetheless	   offer	   a	   purge	  or	   lustration	  of	   sorts,	  whereby	   incriminated	  officials	  were	  
removed	  from	  holding	  public	  office.	  Lastly,	  the	  transfer	  of	  trials	  to	  domestic	  judiciaries	  
has	  strengthened	  local	  state	  capacity	  (Waters	  2013;	  Gow,	  Kerr	  and	  Pajic	  2013).	  
On	   balance,	   given	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   Hague	   conditionality,	  
according	  to	  which	  the	  Western	  Balkan	  aspirants	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  membership	  
were	   expected	   to	   meet	   full	   cooperation	   with	   the	   ICTY	   condition	   before	   proceeding	  
with	  the	  SAP,	  the	  EU’s	  record	  of	  achieving	  justice	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  region	  has	  
at	   best	   been	   modest.	   Three	   dimensions	   of	   the	   EU’s	   policy	   contributed	   to	   the	   EU’s	  
qualified	  success	  in	  this	  policy	  area:	  firstly,	  the	  EU	  policy	  was	  top-­‐down,	  focused	  on	  the	  
political	  elites	  marginalizing	  civil	  society.	  This	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  instrumentalise	  the	  
ICTY	   conditionality	   for	   their	   political	   benefit,	   rather	   than	   promote	   reconciliation	   (cf.	  
Subotic	  2009).	  Secondly,	  the	  EU	  has	  pursued	  a	  state-­‐centred	  approach	  to	  transitional	  
justice,	   which	   is	   a	   poor	   fit	   with	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   Balkans.	  
Consequently,	  activists	  and	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  to	  a	  need	  for	  a	  regional	  instrument	  
to	   transitional	   justice	   (Kandic,	   2007;	   Sriram	   and	   Ross,	   2007;	   Kostovicova	   2009;	  
Rangelov	   and	   Teitel	   2014).	   Thirdly,	   the	   EU	   has	   opted	   to	   focus	   solely	   on	   the	   trials,	  
preferring	   retributive	   transitional	   justice	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   perpetrators	   and	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punishment,	  as	  opposed	  to	  restorative	   transitional	   justice	  mechanisms	  that	  prioritise	  
victims’	  needs	  and	  restoration	  of	  conflict-­‐affected	  relations	  (Kerr	  and	  Mobekk,	  2007).	  	  
The	  European	  Union	  made	  a	  U-­‐turn	  towards	  supporting	  a	  restorative,	  bottom-­‐up	  and	  a	  
regional	  approach	  to	  transitional	   justice,	  through	  funding	  (and,	  to	  an	  extent,	  through	  
political	  support).18	  The	  policy	  change	  stems	  from	  the	  EU’s	  gradual	  recognition	  of	  civil	  
society	   as	   a	   partner	   in	   the	   context	   of	   EU	   approximation,	   reflected	   in	   the	   increased	  
funding	  to	  civil	  society	  since	  2007.	  	  
The	  initiative	  for	  establishing	  the	  Regional	  Commission	  for	  Establishing	  the	  Facts	  about	  
War	   Crimes	   and	   other	   Serious	   Human	   Rights	   Violations	   in	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   or	  
RECOM,	  is	  a	  regional,	  civil	  society	  movement	  that	  has	  grown	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  
perceived	   weaknesses	   of	   trials	   as	   transitional	   justice	   instrument	   and,	   recognized	   a	  
need	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   victims	   and	   overcome	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   state-­‐centred	  
approach.	  The	  initiative’s	  goal	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  interstate	  war	  crimes	  commission.	  	  
But,	   is	   a	   regional	   approach	   superior	   to	   a	   national,	   state-­‐centred	   approach	   to	  
transitional	  justice?	  Is	  the	  EU’s	  new	  policy	  in	  the	  Balkans	  pioneering	  an	  approach	  that	  
should	   be	   replicated	   in	   other	   contexts	   where	   the	   crimes	   also	   have	   a	   transnational	  
character?	  	  	  
Scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  regional	  approach	  is	  bound	  to	  by	  stymied	  by	  irreconcilable	  
national	   perspectives	   of	   victims	   and	   advocates	   (Dragovic-­‐Soso	  2015;	   DiLellio	   and	  
McCunn	   2013).	   While	   the	   RECOM	   process	   has	   yet	   to	   establish	   an	   inter-­‐state	  
commission,	   the	   consultations	   that	   the	   RECOM	   commission	   has	   held	   involving	   over	  
5,000	  members	  from	  all	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  the	  Balkans	  at	  a	  local,	  national	  and	  regional	  
level	  from	  2006	  to	  2010	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  merits	  a	  regional	  approach.	  	  
The	   textual	   analysis	   of	   over	   half	   a	  million	  words	   (or	   511,875	  words)	   of	   textual	   data	  
produced	  by	  the	  RECOM	  consultative	  process	  on	  the	  most	  appropriate	  form	  of	  redress	  
for	  past	  crimes	  points	  to	  a	  moderating	  effect	  of	  the	  regional	  level	  debates,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  national	  and	  local	  level	  ones.	  For	  example,	  the	  regional	  level	  consultations	  tend	  to	  
be	  more	   reconciliatory	   in	   nature	   as	   opposed	   to	   non-­‐regional,	   i.e.	   local	   and	   national	  
ones.	  The	  global	  analysis	  of	  big	  textual	  data	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  quantitative	  and	  
qualitative	   methods	   that	   overcomes	   a	   state-­‐centred	   analysis,	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  
‘methodological	  nationalism’,	  suggests	  that	  a	  regional	  approach	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  
how	  issues	  critical	  to	  reckoning	  with	  the	  past	  are	  discussed,	  and	  how	  contentions	  may	  
be	   resolved.	   The	   reconciliation	   in	   this	   respect	   implies	   the	   openness	   to	   competing	  
perspectives	  on	  the	  conflict	  presented	  by	  members	  of	  ethnic	  groups,	  other	  than	  one’s	  
own.	  	  
Currently,	  the	  RECOM	  process	  is	  faced	  with	  obstacles	  posed	  by	  recalcitrant	  authorities	  
unwilling	   to	   back	   the	   project,	   disengaged	   societies,	   alongside	   illiberal	   civil	   society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  RECOM	  depends	  on	  multiple	  international	  donors.	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groups	  actively	  opposed	   to	   the	   idea	  of	  cross-­‐ethnic	   reconciliation	   (Kostovicova	  2006;	  
Kostovicova	   and	   Bojicic-­‐Dzelilovic,	   2013),	   as	   well	   as	   a	   lack	   of	   external	   support	   that	  
would	  help	  push	  the	  issue	  of	  reckoning	  with	  war	  crimes	  firmly	  on	  the	  political	  agenda.	  
Hence,	   it	   is	   uncertain	   if	   any	   benefits	   that	   have	   been	   gained	   during	   the	   consultative	  
process	   include	   forging	   cross-­‐ethnic	   solidarities	   (Kostovicova	   2010;	   Kostovicova	  
2013b),	  and	  in	  the	  search	  for	  a	  right	  instrument	  for	  transitional	  justice,	  will	  be	  scaled	  
up	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  consultative	  process.	  	  
RECOM’s	  challenges	  are	  illustrative	  of	  broader	  obstacles	  to	  facing	  the	  criminal	  past	  in	  
the	   Western	   Balkans.	   A	   lack	   of	   comprehensive	   transitional	   justice	   measures	  
throughout	  the	  region	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  war	  time	  networks	  at	  all	  
levels	   of	   state	   institutions,	   from	   local	   to	   state.	   Notably,	   these	   networks	   include	  
suspects	   for	  war	   crimes	   that	   have	   escaped	   a	   selective	   net	   cast	   by	   the	   ICTY	   focusing	  
only	  on	  the	  ‘big	  fry,’	  and	  selective	  domestic	  prosecutions.	  The	  figure	  of	  about	  10,000	  
missing	   in	   the	   Balkans	   twenty	   years	   after	   the	   conflict	   points	   to	   the	   unwillingness	   of	  
state	   authorities	   to	   unearth	   the	   facts	   of	   crimes,	   alongside	   the	   human	   remains.	   The	  
result	   goes	   beyond	   the	   dissatisfaction	   and	   injustice	   for	   the	   victims.	   Displaced	   fear	  
return	  to	  homes	  from	  which	  they	  were	  expelled,	  solidifying	  territorial	  ethnic	  divisions	  
drawn	   in	   blood	   during	   the	   conflict.	   Lastly,	   the	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   authorities	   to	  
establish	   the	   exact	   number	   of	   victims	   officially,	   beyond	   efforts	   of	   civil	   society	  
organisations,	  feeds	  into	  irreconcilable	  ethnic	  narratives	  about	  the	  conflict.	  Equally,	   it	  
leaves	   the	   perpetrators	   in	   situ	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   government,	   allowing	   them	   to	  
maintain	   their	  networks	  established	  during	   the	  conflict.	   In	  sum,	   isolated	  examples	  of	  
the	  EU	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  assistance	  reveal	  a	  glaring	  gap	  in	  the	  strategy	  to	  address	  the	  
multifaceted	   criminal	   legacy	   that	   has	   persisted	   for	   over	   20	   years,	   which	   isolated	  
qualified	  successes	  are	  insufficient	  to	  counter.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  and	  policy	  implications	  	  
Since	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  EU	  approach	  to	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  towards	  EU	  member	  state-­‐
building,	   securing	   the	   local	   political	   elites’	   commitment	   and	   cooperation	   has	   been	  
central	   to	   the	   interaction	   between	   these	   elites	   and	   various	   EU	   agents.	   This	   has	  
involved	   different	   forms	   of	   bargaining	   over	   the	   terms	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   policy	  
reforms,	  with	   ambiguous	   consequences	   in	   terms	  of	  peacebuilding.	   	  Although	   the	  EU	  
has	   an	   impressive	   track	   record	   in	   pursuing	   a	   multidimensional	   approach	   to	   the	  
promotion	   of	   peace	   and	   stability	   in	   the	  Western	   Balkans,	   the	   region	   remains	   fragile	  
both	  politically	  as	  well	  as	  economically.	  A	  form	  of	  hybrid	  peace	  which	  has	  emerged	  in	  
the	   context	   of	   the	   EU’s	   combined	   CFSP	   and	   enlargement	   intervention	   may	   have	  
worked	  to	  prevent	  a	  reversion	  to	  armed	  violence	  –	  but	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  grounding	  in	  
improved	   social	   cohesion	   and	   deep	   reconciliation	   which	   these	   societies	   need	   to	  
overcome	  the	  legacy	  of	  war	  and	  its	  associated	  vulnerability.	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Preoccupations	  with	  institutional	  strength,	  tied	  to	  the	  (member)	  state-­‐building	  agenda	  
have	   led	   to	   a	   form	   of	   an	   ‘elite	   peace’	   whereby	   wellbeing	   and	   security	   for	   ordinary	  
people	   in	   their	   everyday	   lives	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   peripheral	   concern	   for	   the	   local	  
authorities.	   	   Despite	   progress	   in	   establishing	   political	   and	   economic	   institutions	   in	  
alignment	   with	   the	   EU	   membership	   criteria,	   those	   institutions	   have	   also	   been	  
vulnerable	   to	   the	   strategies	   of	   informal	   power	   networks	   with	   vested	   interests	   in	  
preserving	   the	   resources	   and	   influence	   accumulated	   during	   the	   region’s	   turbulent	  
transition.	  The	  EU	  state-­‐centric	  approach	  focused	  on	  institutional	  strengthening	  within	  
distinctive	   policy	   domains	   (policy	   ‘silos’)	   has	   not	   been	   able	   to	   dislodge	   the	   informal	  
networks	   which	   operate	   trans-­‐institutionally	   and	   transnationally,	   through	   their	  
regional	   (Balkan)	   and	   global	   ties.	   Instead,	   EU	   efforts	   have	   been	   characterised	   by	   an	  
approach	   which	   demonstrates	   a	   preference	   for	   dealing	   with	   ‘front	   stage’	   problems	  
qualified	   as	   ethnic	   related	   tensions,	   underdeveloped	   market	   economy	   and	   weak	  
governance,	  rather	  than	  exploring	  ‘back	  stage’	  issues	  that	  may	  demonstrate	  a	  variety	  
of	  different	  emergent	  networks,	  including	  those	  that	  indicate	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  type	  
of	   pax	   mafiosa	   (Friesendorf,	   2011:51)	   across	   ethnic	   groups.	   Emergent	   networks	  
include	  cross-­‐national	  and	  cross-­‐ethnic	  drug	  trafficking	  networks	  that	  are	  responsible	  
for	  smuggling	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	  of	  pounds	  worth	  of	  cocaine	  across	   the	  Atlantic	  
and	  into	  Europe	  from	  Latin	  America,	  exacerbating	  the	  challenges	  to	  consolidate	  peace	  
in	  this	  region.	  Interactions	  amongst	  smugglers	  in	  the	  border	  area	  of	  Mitrovica	  between	  
Kosovo	  and	  Serbia,	  and	  in	  the	  south	  with	  Albania,	  has	  also	  been	  an	  example	  of	  inter-­‐
ethnic	  cooperation	  ever	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Devic	  2006:	  267).	  
The	  problems	  is	  partly	  cognitive	  in	  so	  far	  as	  there	  is	   insufficient	  understanding	  of	  the	  
different	   facets	   of	   social	   transformation	   produced	   by	   the	  multiple	   transitions	   in	   the	  
Western	  Balkans,	  which	  includes	  both	  a	  post-­‐Communist	  and	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  transition,	  
and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  modes	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  used	  by	  those	  actors	  that	  have	  
benefited	   in	   the	   process	   to	   maintain	   their	   positions	   secured	   during	   the	   region’s	  
transitions.	   The	  other	   issue	   concerns	   the	   existing	   EU	   instruments	   as	   they	  have	  been	  
applied	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans,	  which	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  engagement	  with	  the	  elites	  
have	   “…distanced	   the	   societal	   transformation	   [required	   by	   the	   EU-­‐supported	  
peacebuilding19]	   from	  its	  core-­‐	  civil	  society	  and	  citizens…”	  (Dzankic	  2015:	  97-­‐98).	  Our	  
analysis,	  alongside	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  hybrid	  development,	  hybrid	  security	  and	  hybrid	  
justice,	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  EU	  policy	  in	  the	  Balkans	  was	  able	  to	  counter	  the	  regressive	  
effect	   of	   conflict	   networks	   where	   it	   supported	   a	   regional	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   (i.e.	   civil	  
society)	   approach,	   which	   figure	   prominently	   as	   principles	   of	   a	   human	   security	  
approach	   elaborated	   by	   Kaldor	   et	   al	   (A	   Human	   Security	   Doctrine	   for	   Europe,	   2004).	  
Notably	  as	  the	  overview	  of	  the	  EU	  policy	  in	  the	  Balkans	  indicates,	  these	  two	  levels	  of	  
engagement	  are	  peripheral	  in	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  toolkit	  in	  the	  region.	  
A	  conflict	  network	  perspective	  provides	  a	  critique	  of	  both	  an	  exclusively	  top-­‐down	  and	  
a	   bottom-­‐up	   approach	   to	   peace-­‐building.	   While	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   approach	   is	   key	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  authors’	  comment.	  
24	  
	  
understanding	   the	   emergence	   of	   networks	   during	   the	   conflict,	   it	   is	   less	   capable	   of	  
explaining	   their	   adaptation	   and	   persistence	   in	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   period.	   Neither	   is	   a	  
commonly	  used	  trope	  of	  state	  weakness	  more	  helpful.	  The	  chameleon-­‐like	  quality	  of	  
networks	   lies	   in	  the	  ability	  of	  network	  members	  to	  operate	  simultaneously	  both	  as	  a	  
part	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  state,	  while	  blurring	  the	  boundaries	  between	  
public	  and	  private,	  internal	  and	  external,	  legal	  and	  illegal.	  Often,	  their	  activity	  is	  most	  
vibrant	  within	  	  ‘regional	  war	  complexes’	  (Pugh	  et	  al,	  2004)	  which	  serve	  as	  conduits	  and	  
as	   an	   interface	  with	   global	   actors	   and	   flows,	   and	  where	  proximity	   and	  pre-­‐war	   links	  
make	  mobilization	  of	  people,	  resources	  and	  ideological	  support	  to	  networks	  that	  much	  
easier.	  The	  networks	  are	  able	  to	  thrive	   in	  the	  context	   in	  which	   informal	  and	  criminal	  
practice	  associated	  with	  their	  agency	  remains	  condoned	  by	  the	  wider	  society	  in	  which	  
they	   are	   anchored,	   and	   where	   opportunities	   for	   securing	   livelihoods	   and	  
developmental	   prospects	   on	   a	   larger	   scale	   are	   constrained	   (Kostovicova	   and	   Bojicic-­‐
Dzelilovic,	  2011;	  Kostovicova	  and	  Bojicic-­‐Dzelilovic,	  2009).	  
Ultimately,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  policy	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  points	  to	  specific	  policy	  
implication.	   The	  biggest	   risk	   currently	   faced	  by	   the	   EU	   in	   the	  post-­‐conflict	   regions	   is	  
that	  a	  raft	  of	  EU	  policy	  instruments,	  including	  formal	  and	  contractual	  incorporation	  in	  
the	   EU,	   will	   not	   be	   accompanied	   by	   normative	   approximation	   to	   the	   EU.	   Instead,	   a	  
formal	   alignment	   with	   the	   EU	   policies	   is	   likely	   to	   coexist	   with	   their	   simultaneous	  
subversion	  and	  distortion	  by	  the	  same	  actors	  who	  are	  the	  EU’s	  main	  interlocutors,	  and	  
even	  promoters	  of	  the	  EU	  agenda	  in	  the	  region.	  Related	  to	  this	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  norms	  
that	   the	   EU	   stands	   for	   and	   promotes	   will	   be	   rejected	   by	   a	   broader	   society.	   For	  
example,	  people	  may	  embrace	  corruption	  and	  entrench	  corruption	  as	  an	  efficient	  way	  
of	  doing	  things.	  Ultimately,	  a	  broader	  society	  may	  come	  to	  perceive	  the	  EU	  project	  as	  
illegitimate	  as	  they	  perceive	  their	  political	  elites.	  Consequently,	  the	  EU	  policies	  need	  to	  
be	   directed	   at	   breaking	   down	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   dependence	   of	   societies	   on	  
their	   ethnic	   elites	   by	   strengthening	   local	   capacity	   for	   challenging	   the	   elites’	  
unaccountability	   as	   well	   as	   by	   ‘smart	   regionalism’	   that	   would	   foster	   alternative	  
progressive	   transnational	   social	   exchange,	   by	   nurturing	   inter-­‐ethnic	   relations	   within	  
and	  between	  the	  states	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  
The	  EU	  already	  deploys	   an	  array	  of	   instruments	  with	   a	  particular	   strength	   in	  human	  
rights	  and	  democracy	  promotion,	  unlike	  its	  approach	  to	  economic	  development	  which	  
has	   been	   less	   effective	   in	   addressing	   the	   needs	   of	   conflict-­‐affected	   societies.	   The	  
challenge	   is	   to	   adjust	   the	   implementation	   strategies	   by	   addressing	   the	   questions	   of	  
how	  and	  with	  whom	  a	  variety	  of	  policies	  and	  interventions	  is	   implemented.	  To	  break	  
the	  economic-­‐ideological-­‐identity	  nexus	   that	   feeds	   societal	   condition	  associated	  with	  
contemporary	   wars,	   the	   main	   challenge	   is	   one	   of	   building	   reform	   constituencies	   to	  
reduce	  a	  space	   for	   the	  abuse	  of	  external	  peacebuilding	  support	  by	   those	  actors	  who	  
benefit	  from	  conflict.	  This	  is	  a	  task	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  local	  societies	  and	  
the	  EU	  policy	  silos,	  and	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  that	  
have	  been	  so	  far	  marginalised	  by	  the	  EU	  focus	  on	  elite	  politics.	   It	  also	  goes	  beyond	  a	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short-­‐	  term	  and	  reactive	  policy	  responses,	  and	  a	  pursuit	  of	  unprincipled	  conditionality	  
policy.	  The	  examples	  of	  new	  initiatives	  would	  be	  a	  mass	  programme	  of	  inter-­‐regional	  
youth	   exchange,	   a	   steady	   support	   for	   building	   trans-­‐regional	   expert	   communities	   as	  
well	   as	   civic	   networks	   engaged	   in	   lobbying	   and	   advocacy	   on	   the	   issues	   of	   human	  
insecurity,	  which	   results	   from	  weak	  and	   corrupt	   governance.	  A	  new	  policy	  paradigm	  
would	   also	   require	   regional	   initiatives	   that	   strengthen	   cooperation	   in	   the	   economic	  
sphere	   so	   that	   a	  hold	  of	   the	   local	  politics	  over	  economy	   is	  undermined,	   to	  pave	   the	  
way	  to	  broad-­‐	  based	  economic	  growth,	   job	  creation	  and	   improved	  welfare	  provision.	  
The	  adaptation	  of	  EU	  conditionality	  policy	  around	  two	  central	  pillars	  of	  responsibility	  
and	  accountability	  would	  be	  an	   important	  element	  of	   the	  new	  policy	  paradigm.	  And	  
lastly,	  a	  new	  policy	  approach	  would	  require	  going	  beyond	  formal	  compliance	  on	  issues	  
of	   corruption	   to	   tackle	   the	   actors	   and	   their	   webs	   of	   connections	   which	   facilitate	  
institutional	  hollowing	  and	  capture	  of	  formal	  processes	  by	  informal	  networks.	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